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Abstract
Previous research has demonstrated that gender influences negotiation behavior
and outcomes. Using role congruity theory, this study examined if the context of
the negotiation, specifically the type of negotiation (integrative vs. distributive),
minimized gender effects in choice of negotiation medium. The relationship
between fear of backlash, anxiety, and self-efficacy on preference for negotiation
medium (virtual vs. face-to-face) was also examined. This study used a 2 Gender:
(Male, Female) x 2 Negotiation Type: (Distributive, Integrative) betweenparticipants design with 206 undergraduate students from a voluntary research
pool. Multiple logistic regression revealed a main effect of gender on negotiation
medium, but no significant interaction of the negotiation approach on the choice
of interaction mode and gender. Moderated regression revealed no significant
main effects for fear of backlash or self-efficacy on the preference for virtual
negotiations, but there was a significant main effect of anxiety on the preference
for virtual negotiations. There was also a significant interaction with gender
moderating the relationship between fear of backlash and preference for virtual
negotiation, but not for the other variables of anxiety or self-efficacy. The
implications of these findings are discussed.

2

Introduction
Negotiations are an important means of resolving conflict and making
decisions. In the workplace, negotiations are used for finalizing contracts,
allocating resources, making decisions, and resolving differences of opinions.
Walton and McKersie (1965) defined negotiation as the “deliberate interactions of
two or more complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the
terms of their interdependence (p. 3).” Negotiations can occur both formally and
informally under different contexts, such as the structure of the negotiation or the
medium the negotiation occurs through. It appears that the negotiation processes
and outcomes can differ based on individual differences, and specifically by
gender(e.g., Amantullah & Morris, 2010; Bear & Babcock, 2012; Bowles,
Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Elfenbien, 2015; Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher &
Linnabery, 2013). It is worthwhile to better understand these gender differences
for their own sake, as well as their impact in workplace discrimination and the
gender pay gap.
The gender pay gap refers to the difference in average earning between
men and women employees. The gender pay gap is a continuing international
problem which seems unlikely to vanish at its current rate of convergence (Blau
& Kahn, 2007; Khoreva, 2011). The gender pay gap has been explained as falling
into two categories: macro and micro (Auster, 1989). The macro level proposes
that women are seen as a homogeneous group, while the micro level focuses on
the contextual factors that lead to biases (Auster, 1989; Khoreva, 2011). The
slowdown of the gender pay gap convergence (Blau & Kahn, 2006; Blau & Kahn,
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2007) has been explained by numerous factors including changes in gender
differences in unmeasured characteristics and in labor market discrimination
(Blau & Kahn, 2006). Individual factors such as pay expectations, gender role
orientation, and perceived pay fairness continue to facilitate the perception of the
gender pay gap (Khoreva, 2011). These micro level contextual factors are
therefore important to research to accelerate the gender pay gap convergence.
Investigating the negotiation context, which has the potential to create a situation
which can either eliminate or encourage inequalities between individuals, is a
desirable contribution to the understanding of why the gender pay gap still occurs.
If a situation exists which minimizes gender effects in negotiations, this would
guide an understanding of remedies and interventions organizations could
implement to create equal opportunities for employees. This paper aims to
evaluate the creation of such a situation through the context of the negotiation,
using the understanding of role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002) as its
foundation.
This research aimed to examine the relationship between negotiation
context and individual differences. Specifically, I first review the different types
of negotiations. Then, the impact of individual differences, specifically gender, on
negotiations are discussed. Finally, the relationship between negotiation context
and gender are discussed. These findings are then be discussed in the context of
the gender pay gap convergence.
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Approaches to Negotiations
Two common approaches to workplace negotiations are labeled
distributive (also known as win – lose) and integrative (or win – win)
negotiations. In a distributive negotiation, the interests of the negotiators are
negatively correlated, such that a positive outcome for one party is associated
with a decrease for the other party involved (Walter & McKersie, 1965).
Behaviors from a distributive frame point can be classified as claiming value from
a fixed pie perspective (Brett, 2007). Examples of claiming value behaviors
include making single issue offers, referring to the “bottom line”, referring to a
negotiator’s power, and using threats (Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2006).
Integrative negotiations hold the possibility of joint gain from the negotiation,
where both parties can find a positive solution. Integrative framing contains
behaviors that create value by expanding the pie of resources (Brett, 2007).
Behaviors that exemplify creating value include making multi-issue offers,
making positive comments, and suggesting compromise (Weingart et al., 2006). It
is common for individuals to enter a negotiation with cognitive biases, such as
incompatibility error and fixed sum error, in which both parties believe that their
interests, and importance of interests are incompatible (Thompson & Hastie,
1990; Thompson, Neal, & Sinaceur, 2004).
Negotiations can occur in many different ways and no longer constrained
to face-to-face interactions, with the opportunity to use technology available daily
(Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006). Negotiations take place virtually (through email,
text, telephone, or video), as well as face-to-face. The communication medium
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affects the negotiation process and outcomes through the properties of
synchronicity, communication channels, and efficacy (McGinn & Croson, 2004).
Social awareness in negotiation is enhanced by high efficacy, synchronous
communication with multiple communication channels, such as through face-toface and videoconferencing mediums, which leads to a shared understanding of
the negotiation process (McGinn & Croson, 2004). Media-rich communication
are those that have display cues, tones, facial expressions, and body language,
such as face-to-face and videoconferencing. Media-poor communication (e.g.
telephone and email) obstructs the transfer of cues and expressions. Media-rich
communication, as opposed to media-poor communication, are believed to
encourage collaborative behaviors during negotiations than poorer media, such as
over the telephone or computer-mediated written communications (Purdy & Nye,
2000). Purdy and Nye (2000) suggest that high media richness reduces the
required bargaining time and increases outcome satisfaction and the desire for
future negotiation interactions. When media-poor communication is used in
negotiations, individuals can experience the other party to be more distant an
unknown, compared to face-to-face negotiations (Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006).
When the negotiating parties have no prior relationship, contact, or shared
identity, the communication medium used for negotiating can exert a strong
influence on the perception of one’s negotiating counterpart and the subsequent
outcome of the negotiation. This is prevalent in virtual communication, given the
reduction and/or absence of visual information and non-verbal cues (Nadler &
Shestowsky, 2006). It is also possible that in some situations virtual
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communication neutralizes cues of status and composure, creating a degree of
equality in negotiations (Wachter, 1999). This research hopes to examine this
potential effect.
Individual Differences in Negotiations
Gender. Overall, women have been found to negotiate slightly worse
economic outcomes than men (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999).
Because negotiations provide resources, these negotiations may impact gender
equality in the workplace. Role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002) has been
used to explain why these gender differences occur in a negotiation (for a review
see Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Agentic qualities like assertiveness,
confidence, and dominance are typically expected of an individual in a
negotiating role, but are incongruent with the traditional female gender role.
Because of this role incongruity, prejudice against women in negotiator roles
leads to women being perceived as less favorable in the role, or even achieving
less economic success than men. As stated by Stuhlmacher and Linnabery (2013),
this role incongruity does not mean that women are incapable of being good
negotiators, or that communal attributes are not important in negotiations. This
role incongruity instead implies that there are particular challenges in negotiations
for women to overcome.
Female negotiators risk an unfavorable evaluation for being inconsistent
with what is anticipated. This backlash is reduced when women negotiate on
behalf of someone else, as opposed to negotiating for themselves, because it is
more consistent with the traditional female gender role (Amanatullah & Morris,
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2010; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). When negotiating for oneself, the
negotiation outcomes favored men, but the difference was no longer present when
negotiators were acting on the behalf of, or advocating for, a single individual.
Indeed, meta-analytic research finds that women are more successful than men
when negotiating on behalf of another (Mazei et al., 2015).
The framing of a negotiation also affects gendered outcomes. Women
were more likely to initiate a negotiation when they were cued to “ask” instead of
to “negotiate” (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007). Small and
colleagues (2007) argue that this is because the language of asking is more
consistent with a lower social role, and a gesture of politeness. Additionally, when
the task was framed as more congruent with their social role based on the topic of
the negotiation, women were more successful negotiators (Bear, 2011; Bear &
Babcock, 2012). In a lab-based experiment, Bear (2011) found an interaction
between gender and negotiation topic. Participants were assigned to read a
scenario, the topic being either masculine (compensation) or feminine (workplace
lactation room), in which someone expressed a desire to negotiate. The
participants could choose to either negotiate with the individual themselves or
avoid it by passing it off to someone else. Men were significantly more likely to
avoid a negotiation when the topic concerned a lactation room than when it
concerned compensation. Additionally, women were significantly more likely to
avoid compensation negotiation compared to the lactation room condition.
Similarly, men outperformed women in a negotiation task when the topic was
masculine of nature (e.g., motorcycle headlights), but the gender difference was
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eliminated when the topic was feminine (e.g., jewelry beads) (Bear & Babcock,
2012). When the topic was compensation, men were found to indicate a higher
likelihood of active negotiation than women (Kaman & Hartel, 1994).
In a negotiation, individuals are expected to be aggressive, egotistic, and
focused the outcomes; this fits into the agentic masculine gender role. It has been
suggested that in a negotiation, women will apply more cooperative strategies,
while men will apply more competitive strategies (Miles & LaSalle, 2009; Rubin
& Brown, 1975). A meta-analysis (Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998) found
that women were slightly more cooperative than men in negotiations, but the
effect reversed in certain situations. One of these situations was during non-faceto-face negotiations. In these situations, women displayed more competitive
behaviors than men. This occurred when the interaction only transpired through a
declaration of one’s choices and communication was limited, reducing the need to
fit perceptions of cooperativeness. This hidden identity in virtual negotiations is
one of the example factors outlined by Stuhlmacher and Linnabery (2013) that
could potentially increase negotiator role and gender role congruity for women.
Gender and approach to negotiations. The question remains as to how
gender impacts integrative negotiations. In an integrative distribution, higher joint
outcomes are achieved through communications and prosocial motives which fit
into the communal roles. Thompson and DeHarpport (1998) found that when
friends perceived a negotiation task as a problem-solving situation and were
similar in communal orientation, they were more likely to make the most of joint
interests. Participants were assigned to either a problem-solving condition or a
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bargaining condition. Participants who viewed the task as a joint problem-solving
situation, as opposed to those who viewed the task as a bargaining situation,
expected the interaction to be more cooperative, less competitive, and more fair.
Gender and virtual negotiations. In a virtual environment, social roles
are less prescribed, providing a weak situation with high ambiguity for behavioral
expectations (Stuhlmacher, Citera, & Willis, 2007). In a written virtual
negotiation, there are fewer cues (voice hesitation, tone, eye contact, body
language, facial expression, etc.), which allows for female roles to be less salient
and the negotiator role to be more salient, which permits women to be more
aggressive than in face-to-face negotiations (Stuhlmacher et al., 2007;
Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Virtual negotiations also equalize prenegotiation power differences (Turnbull, Strickland, & Shaver, 1976).
Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017) found a gender difference in the behavioral
outcome of choosing a negotiation medium, of face-to-face or a chat program on a
computer. Participants were told that they were going to negotiate a job offer with
an individual in a different room. Participants were given instructions in preparing
for a traditional distributive salary negotiation. After reading over the task, they
were asked if they would like the negotiation to be face-to-face or over a chat
program on a computer. Women were 5.28 times more likely than men to choose
the chat program than face-to-face for their negotiation. This finding found a
gender difference in the behavior of individuals as they approach a negotiation.
This paper build offs of the findings of Stuhlmacher and Reich to test how
the negotiation situation will change the individuals’ choice of negotiation
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medium. It was expected that women are more likely than men to choose to
negotiate virtually in a distributive negotiation than an integrative negotiation.
Virtual negotiations make the female gender role less salient (Stuhlmacher &
Linnabery, 2013), and could be seen as an advantage to women as they enter a
traditional distributive negotiation. However, integrative negotiations are aligned
more with the female gender role. Therefore, framing a negotiation as integrative
would be congruent for women, and provide a situation where women are more
likely to choose face-to-face instead of virtual negotiation.
Explanatory Variables
Fear of Backlash. One factor that impacts gender differences in
negotiation outcomes is fear of backlash. The effects of backlash are defined as
“social and economic reprisals for behaving counter stereotypically” (Rudman,
1998). For women, backlash can occur when they present themselves with agency
and authority, violating their communal gender role. This puts women in a
dilemma where they must choose to avoid backlash by staying in line with their
gender roles and be liked but not respected, or display agentic qualities that match
job-specific demands and be respected but potentially not liked (Rudman &
Phelan, 2008). In a lab-based experiment testing the status incongruity hypothesis,
women who were high on agency in leadership positions suffered the most
sabotage compared to all other targets (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts,
2012). Initiating a negotiation also has a greater social cost for women (as
compared to men), where there is less interest for working with a woman whom
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initiated a negotiation than for a woman whom did not initiate a negotiation
(Bowles et al., 2007).
Therefore, in a traditional distributive negotiation, women may expect
more backlash for violating their gender stereotype and negotiating solely for
themselves. In a negotiation that is framed as integrative, women may expect less
backlash because they are attempting to reach a deal which is mutually beneficial
and shows concern for others, which is in line with their gender role. The fear of
backlash may therefore change the behavior of a woman choosing her negotiation
medium. If backlash is expected because of the distributive negotiation, women
may be more likely to choose to negotiate virtually where their social role is less
prescribed. If backlash is not expected because of an integrative negotiation,
gender will moderate the impact of fear of backlash and women may be more
likely to choose face-to-face negotiation because the female gender role can be
beneficial in this situation.
Anxiety. A second individual difference that influences negotiations are
feelings of anxiety. Anxiety is a state of psychological arousal, which one
experiences in response to a situation where the individual is uncertain about a
novel situation, the potential for undesirable outcomes, and the inability to alter
the course of events (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Gray, 1991; Raghunathan &
Pham, 1999). Anxious individuals have been found to be biased in favor of lowrisk/low-reward options when it comes to decision making (Raghunathan &
Pham, 1999). For example, when compared to a neutral emotional state, anxious
negotiators had lower expectations, made lower first offers, responded to
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counteroffers more quickly, and exited negotiations earlier (Brooks & Schweitzer,
2011). Additionaly, consistent with the belief that women are more anxious in
traditional negotiations, women (compared to men) are found to experience
greater relief when their first offer is accepted, specifically in weak situations
(Kray & Gelfand, 2009).
Anxious individuals may be more likely to choose to negotiate virtually to
reduce some of the pressure from face-to-face negotiations. In a distributive
negotiation, individuals may experience more anxiety, as it is consistent with the
traditional bargaining view. Therefore, when individuals, specifically women, are
presented with a distributive negotiation situation, it could result in higher anxiety
because it is gender incongruent. In an integrative negotiation, individuals are
instructed to work together to receive an ideal solution for both parties involved.
This minimizes the potential for undesirable outcomes, and may therefore lead to
lower anxiety. With this lower anxiety, individuals may be more likely to
negotiate face-to-face, as the risk and pressure of the negotiation is now lower
because of the situation.
Negotiator Self-efficacy. A third individual difference variable that
influences negotiation is self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is the belief that one can
succeed and reach his or her goal. Individuals with high negotiation self-efficacy
were less affected by anxiety, moderating the effects on earlier exits from a
negotiation, which results in lower economic outcomes (Brooks & Schweitzer,
2011). While a direct effect for self-efficacy on outcomes was not found,
Sullivan, O’Connor, and Burris (2006) found a direct effect on negotiators’
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behaviors, and an indirect effect on negotiation outcomes. Individuals with high
distributive negotiator self-efficacy were more likely to use choose distributive
tactics, such as claiming value by dividing fixed resources, aiming to make the
other party make concessions, and collecting most of the resources, which lead to
positive outcomes on distributive issues. Individuals with high integrative
negotiator self-efficacy choose more integrative tactics, such as creating value by
exchanging information about interests, packaging interests in a creative way, and
rapport building, which lead to positive outcomes for integrative issues.
Furthermore, negotiator self-efficacy had a strong influence on a negotiators’
choice of tactics during the initial phase of a negotiation, which is a time when the
negotiator is most anxious.
Self-efficacy is also impacted by the contextual ambiguity of the situation,
when cues are either strong or weak and protocols are either known or unknown.
Miles and LaSalle (2008) found that counterpart self-efficacy was strongly related
to performance in negotiation situation with higher contextual ambiguity than in
situations of lower contextual ambiguity. Therefore, when the context of the
situation was weak and unclear, the perceived self-efficacy of the negotiating
counterpart was more important in the negotiation. When the structure and/or
context of a negotiation is unclear, individual differences begin to play a role in
the performance of the negotiator and the overall outcome of the negotiation.
Rationale
Previous research has shown that gender influences negotiation behavior
and outcomes (e.g., Amantullah & Morris, 2010; Bear & Babcock, 2012; Bowles,
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Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Elfenbien, 2015; Mazei et al., 2015). Distributive
negotiations tend to focus on claiming resources, while integrative negotiations
focus on creating resources to achieve higher joint outcomes (Beersma & De
Dreu, 2002; De Dreu et al., 2000; Giebels et al., 2000). If virtual negotiations
reduce gender role pressures and expectations (Stuhlmacher et al., 2007;
Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013), it was expected that in a distributive
negotiation, men will be more likely to choose face-to-face negotiation, while
women would be more likely to choose virtual negotiations.
Previous research found that women who display agentic qualities as part
of their job requirements experience backlash for doing so (Rudman & Phelan,
2008; Rudman et al., 2012). Distributive negotiations seem to require negotiators
to be more aggressive and agentic, which causes women to fear potential backlash
when entering a distributive negotiation. Therefore, it was expected that those
who fear backlash would be more likely to choose virtual negotiations than faceto-face negotiation where their gender roles are more prescribed.
Anxiety has been found to influence the outcomes of negotiations and
decision making (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).
Women have been found to be more anxious negotiators (Kray & Gelfand, 2009).
Therefore, it was proposed that women with high anxiety would be more likely to
choose virtual negotiations, which have been found to equalize pre-negotiation
power differences (Turnbull, Strickland, & Shaver, 1976).
High negotiator self-efficacy has been found to moderate the effects of
anxiety and have an effect on the outcome of a negotiation (Brooks & Schweitzer,
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2011; Sullivan et al., 2006). Specifically, high distributive self-efficacy has led to
positive outcomes on distributive issues and high integrative self-efficacy has led
to positive outcomes on integrative issues (Sullivan et al., 2006). Given that
distributive negotiations are more in line with agentic qualities, and integrative
negotiations are more in line with communal qualities, it was proposed that selfefficacy would mediate an individual’s choice of interaction mode.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis I. There will be a main effect of gender on choice of negotiation
interaction mode. Men will be more likely to pick face-to-face negotiations than
women.
Hypothesis II. There will be an interaction of the negotiation approach on choice
of interaction mode and gender with fewer women choosing face-to-face over
virtual negotiation in distributively framed tasks than in integratively framed
tasks.
Hypothesis III. More fear of backlash will be associated with stronger preference
for virtual negotiations than face-to-face.
Hypothesis IV. More anxiety will be associated with more preference for virtual
negotiations.
Hypothesis V. Negotiators with lower self-efficacy will be more likely to prefer
virtual negotiations.
Hypothesis VI. Gender will moderate the relationship between fear of backlash
and stronger preferences for virtual negotiations than face-to-face. The
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relationship between fear of backlash and preferences for virtual negotiations is
stronger for women than for men.
Hypothesis VII. Gender will moderate the relationship between anxiety and more
preference for virtual negotiations. The relationship between anxiety and
preference for virtual negotiations is stronger for women than for men.
Hypothesis VIII. Gender will moderate the relationship between self-efficacy
and more preference for virtual negotiations. The relationship between selfefficacy and preference for virtual negotiations is stronger for women than for
men.
Method
Participants
Participants were 206 undergraduate students from a voluntary research
pool. This sample size was based on a medium effect size at power = .80 for a
two-way ANOVA at =.05 (Cohen, 1992). Participants were at least 18 years of
age, with 102 female and 104 male participants.
Design
This study used a 2 Gender: (Male, Female) x 2 Negotiation Type:
(Distributive, Integrative) between-participants design. In the Distributive
Condition, there were 51 male and 52 female participants. In the Integrative
Condition, there were 53 male and 50 female participants.
Procedure
Upon arrival to the experimental room, participants were greeted by the
experimenter and were instructed that they were going to work with an individual
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who is in a different room. All experimenters for this study were female.
Participants were randomly assigned to a negotiation task (Integrative or
Distributive) when they arrived according to a random number table (Appendix
A). After completing informed consent procedures (Appendix B), participants
read an instruction sheet for the experiment and were told by the experimenter
that they were going to be participating in job offer negotiation. This study used
the negotiation task from Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017). Past participants from
Stuhlmacher and Reich were blocked from participating.
Half the participants received distributively framed instructions, while
other participants received integratively framed instructions (see Appendix C).
These instructions were taken as a variation from the problem-solving condition
(integrative) and the bargaining condition (distributive) from Thompson and
DeHarpport (1998).
Both task conditions began with the same prompt: “You have been hired
for a new job, but you still need to work out the fine details of terms of
employment with your hiring manager.” For the distributive condition, the second
half of the instructions were the following: “Think of this task as a negotiation
situation in which you are trying to get what you want and must bargain for
it.” For the integrative condition, the following instructions were used for the
second half: “Think of this task as a situation in which you face a common
problem and must work with the hiring manager to create a solution that
works for both you and the company.” The experimenter explained the
preference payoff table to the participant and asked if they had any clarification
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questions. To reinforce the manipulation, participants were asked to list three
tactics they would use to meet this goal. The researcher also verbally repeated the
goal of the negotiation to the participant to make sure they understand.
Next, participants filled out their goals for the negotiation (Appendix D),
negotiator self-efficacy (Appendix E), and negotiator anxiety (Appendix F).
Participants then were asked to choose between face-to-face or a text-based chat
program for the experiment, and rated their preference for both negotiation
mediums (Appendix G). Participants were then told that there are more topics to
negotiate if there is enough time. Related to this potential second negotiation,
participants were then given the second set of tasks (Appendix C), asked to list
their tactics, goals (Appendix D), and preference for both negotiation mediums
(Appendix G) again. This was aimed at providing a measure of reliability.
While the experimenter was seeming to set up for the negotiation by
stepping out of the room to inform the hiring manager of the chosen negotiation
medium, the participant filled out the control measures and demographic survey
(Appendix H). Once the participant finished the measures, they were informed
that no negotiation or interaction will occur. They then took a measure of
relief/regret (Appendix I).
Participants were debriefed (Appendix J) and reasons for the deception
were explained. Participants received 1.5 credit for research participation for a
psychology course. The procedure took around 30-45 minutes for each participant
to complete. Figure 1 provides a flow diagram of the experimental procedure.
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Measures
Goals. Participants stated their ideal number of points they wished to
achieve (range 150 to 750) in the negotiation, the least number of points they
were willing to accept in the negotiations (range 150 to 750), and a first offer for
each category (see Appendix D).
Fear of Backlash. Fear of backlash was measured with two open-ended
questions (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010), asking how much negotiators can
reasonably ask for (see Appendix D). Items included: “How much (in total points
value) do you think you can reasonably ask for without your counterpart
perceiving you to be a pushy person?” and “How much (in total points value) do
you think you can reasonably ask for without causing your counterpart to punish
you for being too demanding?” The two items were averaged into a single
measure for fear of backlash. To make this number more intuitive during
analyses, the pole was reversed by subtracting each individual score from 900,
which was the sum of the possible minimum and maximum answers for the fear
of backlash items. Higher numbers therefore reflect more fear of backlash.
Negotiator Self-efficacy. The eight-item negotiator self-efficacy scale
(Sullivan, O'Connor, & Burris, 2006) was used (see Appendix E). This measure
has four items on integrative self-efficacy and four items on distributive selfefficacy. Each item is rated on a 100-point scale, where 0 = no confidence and
100 = full confidence, describing how confident the participant feels they are in
using each tactic successfully in a given negotiation. Example items included:
“Prevent the other negotiator from exploiting your weaknesses (distributive)”
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“Find tradeoffs that benefit both parties (integrative)”. Self-efficacy was averaged
into scores for integrative self-efficacy, distributive self-efficacy, and total selfefficacy.
Negotiator Anxiety. Negotiator anxiety was measured by four anxietyrelated emotions and four neutral-related emotions (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011).
Participants rated (1= not strongly at all, 7 = very strongly) four anxiety emotions:
anxious, apprehensive, worried, and nervous and four neutral emotions: neutral,
indifferent, unemotional, and calm (see Appendix F). Anxiety was averaged into
scores for anxious and neutral emotions.
Negotiation Medium. Preference for medium was measured in two ways:
behavioral and self-report. Participants were asked to choose to negotiate either
face-to-face or over a text-based chat program on a computer. Negotiation
medium was coded as 0 for Face-to-Face, 1 for Virtual. A second measure of selfreport on how strongly they prefer a text-based chat program or face-to-face as
their medium of negotiation on a single item 7-point spectrum (1 = Face-to-Face,
7 = Virtual). This item was asked twice for reliability and the average of the two
scores was used to increase variance. Participants were asked an open-ended
question on why they chose either face-to-face or chat (see Appendix G).
Demographics. Formal negotiation experience was measured to control
for negotiation experience on a 7-point scale (1 = no experience, 7 = I’m an
expert) (Eflenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro, 2008). Participants
responded to one question on sex and race/ethnicity. Technology use was
measured on a 7-point scale for text-messaging, emails, phone calls, video calls,
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with 1 = rarely ever communicate this way and 7 = always communicate this way
(see Appendix H). Gender was coded as 0 for Male, 1 for Female. Race/ethnicity
was coded as 0 for White, 1 for Black/African American, 2 for American
Indian/Alaskan Native, 3 for Asian/Pacific Islander, 4 for
Latino/Hispanic/Spanish Origin, 5 for Biracial, and 6 for Other.
Negotiator Relief/Regret. Relief and regret (Kray & Gelfand, 2009) was
measured upon finding out that there was not a real negotiation (Appendix I). The
two items were on a 7-point scale (1 = no relief/regret, 7 = very
relieved/regretful).
Results
Descriptive Analyses
Descriptive analyses were run for demographic variables (see Table 1).
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the means and standard deviations of the
variables of the main variables based on gender and condition. Pearson correlation
coefficients between the variables of gender, method chosen, preference for
negotiation medium, backlash, anxiety, and self-efficacy are provided in Table 3.
Significant correlations were found between all of the variables. Aimed at
providing a measure of reliability, preference for virtual negotiation was asked at
two different time points. These two items were found to have a significant
correlation (r(204) = 0.83, p < 0.01), and to be internally consistent (a = 0.91),
allowing us to confidently conclude an individual’s preference for virtual
negotiations. Additionally, method of negotiation was also found to have a
significant correlation with both relief (r(204) = 0.40, p < 0.01) and regret (r(204)

22

= -0.23, p < 0.01). Participants who chose virtual negotiation, compared to
participants who chose face-to-face negotiations, were more relieved and less
regretful upon finding out that there would not be a real negotiation.
Hypothesis Testing
Hypotheses I & II. Multiple logistic regression was run in R to analyze
hypotheses 1-2. Model 0 was the main effects model which examined the effect of
the variables gender, fear of backlash, anxiety, and negotiator self-efficacy on the
dichotomous dependent variable for choice of negotiation medium (Table 4).
Model 1 was the interaction effects model, which examined the interaction of
gender on the variables of fear of backlash, anxiety, and negotiator self-efficacy
on the dichotomous dependent variable for choice of negotiation medium (Table
5). An ANOVA was computed to compare Model 1 to Model 0 (Table 6) finding
that Model 1 explained more variance above and beyond that of Model 0
(F(4,196) = 6.011, p = 0.198. Therefore, the coefficients from Model 1 were used
to analyze Hypotheses I-II.
Analyses revealed a main effect of gender on choice of interaction mode
(b = 0.67, z(204) = 1.49, p = 0.137), with men, compared to women, being more
likely to pick face-to-face negotiations over virtual negotiations, supporting
Hypothesis I. However, there was not a strong effect for the interaction of the
negotiation approach on the choice of negotiation medium and gender (b = -0.14,
z(204) = -0.22, p = 0.829), leaving Hypothesis II unsupported.
As shown in Table 8 (see Table 7 for the probability estimates for the
Main Effects Model 0), in the distributively framed negotiations, the probability

23

to choose to negotiate face-to-face was higher for males (65.12%), than compared
to females (48.88%). In the integratively framed negotiations, the probability to
choose to negotiate face-to-face was still higher for males (75.77%), than
compared to females (61.57%). Given the effect for both the main effect of
anxiety (b = 0.85, z(204) = 2.67, p = 0.008), as well as the interaction of gender
and anxiety (b = -0.78, z(204) = -1.97, p = 0.048), Table 9 breaks down the
probability estimates based on high/low anxiety. The probability of choosing to
negotiate face-to-face was highest for males when they had low anxiety in both
the distributely (73.92%) and integratively (82.61%) framed negotiations, as
compared to high anxiety in the distibutively (55.14%) and integratively (67.32%)
framed negotiations. The probability of choosing to negotiate face-to-face was
also highest for females when they had low anxiety in both the distributely
(59.22%) and integratively (70.88%) framed negotiations, as compared to high
anxiety in the distibutively (38.64%) and integratively (51.34%) framed
negotiations.
Hypotheses III-VIII. Moderated regression was run in R to analyze
hypotheses 3-8, with the continuous variables of fear of backlash, anxiety, and
negotiator self-efficacy centered. Model 0 was the main effects model which
examined the effect of the variables gender, fear of backlash, anxiety, and
negotiator self-efficacy on the dependent variable of preference for virtual
negotiations (Table 10). Model 1 was the interaction effects model, which
examined the interaction of gender on the variables of fear of backlash, anxiety,
and negotiator self-efficacy on the dependent variable of preference for virtual
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negotiations (Table 11). An ANOVA was computed to compare Model 1 to
Model 0 (Table 12) finding that Model 1 significantly explained more variance
above and beyond that of Model 0 (F(4,196) = 2.25, p = 0.065). Therefore, the
coefficients from Model 1 were used to analyze Hypotheses III-VIII.
Hypothesis III predicted that more fear of backlash leads to a stronger
preference for virtual negotiations than face-to-face, was unsupported (b = 0.03,
t(204) = 0.34, p = 0.732). Hypothesis IV predicted that more anxiety leads to
increased preference for virtual negotiation was found to be supported (b = 0.23,
t(204) = 1.98, p = 0.049). Hypothesis V predicted that negotiators with lower selfefficacy will prefer virtual negotiations, was unsupported (b = -0.16, t(204) = 1.34, p = 0.183). Figure 2 depicts the overall model for Hypotheses III-VIII based
on Model 1. As predicted, greater fear of backlash and greater anxiety had a
positive relationship with preference for virtual negotiations while greater
negotiator self-efficacy had a negative relationship with virtual negotiations.
Hypotheses VII-VIII include gender as a moderator for the variables fear
of backlash, anxiety, and self-efficacy on the preference for virtual negotiations.
Gender itself had a significant main effect on the preference for virtual
negotiations (b = 0.52, t(204) = 2.76, p = 0.006). Hypothesis VI predicted that
gender would moderate the relationship between fear of backlash and stronger
preferences for virtual negotiations than face-to-face. Specifically, it was
predicted that the relationship between fear of backlash and preferences for virtual
negotiations is stronger for women than for men. This relationship (see Figure 3)
was supported such that women had a greater fear of backlash with a stronger

25

preference for virtual negotiations (b = 0.33, t(204) = 2.46, p = 0.015). Hypothesis
VII (see Figure 4) predicted that gender would moderate the relationship between
anxiety and more preference for virtual negotiations was unsupported (b = -0.19,
t(204) = -1.27, p = 0.204). Hypothesis VIII (see Figure 5) predicted that gender
would moderate the relationship between self-efficacy and more preference for
virtual negotiations was also unsupported (b = 0.09, t(204) = 0.64, p = 0.525).
Discussion
This study investigated if the framing of a negotiation impacts an
individual’s choice of negotiation medium. Specifically, I examined if the gender
difference in behaviors of individuals as they approach a negotiation found by
Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017) could be mitigated based on the negotiation
situation. Drawing on role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), I theorized
that framing a negotiation as integrative would be more congruent for women and
provide a negotiation situation which aligns the negotiator role with the female
gender role (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013).
This study found that there is a significant main effect for gender on both
choice and preference for mode of negotiations. Consistent with the findings of
Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017), women, compared to men, were more likely to
choose to negotiate virtually over a text-based chat program rather than face-toface. The framing of the negotiation as distributive or integrative did not impact
this behavioral decision.
One prediction that did find support was the moderation of gender
between fear of backlash and preference for negotiation. The negotiator role in
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typically viewed as being incongruent with the female gender role (Stuhlmacher
& Linnabery, 2013). Therefore, when entering a negotiation, women potentially
put themselves at risk by violating their communal gender role to match the
agentic qualities of the negotiator role (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Therefore, this
finding suggests that women who feel they can only reasonably ask for less
without being perceived as pushy or too demanding have higher preferences for
virtual, rather than face-to-face, negotiations.
Surprisingly, the prediction that gender would moderate the relationships
between anxiety with preference for virtual negotiations was unsupported. Given
that past research has shown anxious individuals to be biased in favor of lowrisk/low-reward options (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), it was expected that the
relationship between anxiety and preference for virtual negotiations would be
stronger for women than for men. This prediction was based on the assumption
that virtual negotiations provided a low-risk outlet that allows female roles to be
less salient compared to face-to-face negotiations (Stuhlmacher et al., 2007;
Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). However, anxiety was shown to have a large
effect on the behavioral decision of choosing face-to-face or a text-based virtual
chat program for the negotiation. Both men and women with higher anxiety about
the upcoming negotiation were more likely to choose to negotiate virtually. The
main effect for anxiety itself on preference for virtual negotiations was
significant, suggesting that virtual negotiations provides a low-risk outlet for both
men and women anxious about an upcoming negotiation.
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Additionally, the prediction that gender would moderate the relationship
between self-efficacy with preference for virtual negotiations was also
unsupported. The prediction of self-efficacy was based off of the finding that selfefficacy has a direct effect on negotiator’s behaviors, such as choosing more
integrative or distributive tactics (Sullivan et al., 2006). Therefore, while it is
surprising to find that gender did not moderate the relationship between selfefficacy and preference for virtual negotiation, future analyses could examine if
the negotiation condition (distributive vs. integrative) moderates this relationship.
Limitations
One possible limitation is the use of the word “negotiation” throughout.
Previous research has found that women were more likely to initiate a negotiation
when they were cued to “ask” instead of to “negotiate” (Small et al., 2007). The
language of asking is more consistent with a lower social role, while negotiations
have been typically viewed as an agentic pursuit. The choice to keep the word
negotiate in the study was to be able to provide direct comparisons between this
study and the one conducted by Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017). Therefore, future
research could consider removing the word “negotiate” throughout the study to
avoid the agentic priming of the negotiation situation.
While the framing of the negotiation did not have an effect on the gender
difference in behaviors of individuals as they approach a negotiation, a second
limitation of this study was the failure to include the framing condition in the
analyses for Hypotheses III-VIII. In this present study, Hypotheses III-VIII
examined if gender moderated the relationship between fear of backlash, anxiety,
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and negotiator self-efficacy on preference for virtual negotiation. This did not take
into account if the negotiation was distributively or integratively framed. Given
the current lack of supported predictions, it would be worthwhile for future
analyses to include the framing condition while examining Hypotheses VI-VIII. It
is possible that while it did not have a direct effect on a behavioral outcome
(Hypothesis II), the framing could have affected the control variables fear of
backlash, anxiety, and self-efficacy, having an indirect effect on preference for
virtual negotiation.
Future Directions
One area for future research is to consider the time-point participants are
asked to choose a negotiation medium. In the current procedure participants
complete the measure for fear of backlash, anxiety, and self-efficacy before being
told that they have the option to choose between face-to-face or a text-based chat
program on the computer. It was noted in the experimental lab log that this choice
was a surprise for some participants, being unaware that there were potential
options for the negotiation medium. Therefore, the general assumption of
participants was that they would be participating in a face-to-face negotiation
when filling out these measures. Method of negotiation was found to have
significant correlations with all of the variables of interest (Table 2). While not
included in the proposed hypotheses, a measure of relief and regret was given to
the participants at the end of the procedure, once they knew that no real
negotiation would be occurring. Method of negotiation had a significant
correlation with both relief and regret, such that participants who chose virtual
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negotiation, compared to participants who chose face-to-face negotiations, were
more relieved and less regretful upon finding out that there would not be a real
negotiation. Additionally, fear of backlash after negotiation medium might
determine if there has been a change in the amount participants feel they can
reasonable ask for without being perceived as push or demand, especially for
those who chose to negotiate virtually.
Implications
The findings of this study demonstrated that women, compared to men,
prefer to negotiate virtually over a text-based chat program rather than face-toface, with the fear of backlash being a moderator in this relationship. In the
workplace context, this is an important consideration for the gender pay gap. This
study demonstrates that negotiation medium remains a micro level contextual
factor that can encourage inequalities between individuals for both distributively
framed and integratively framed negotiations. Given the role of fear of backlash
in this relationship, it is therefore advised to encourage organizations that
participate in salary negotiations to consider both virtual and face-to-face options.
This will allow individuals, particularly women, who feel that they can only
reasonably ask for less without being perceived as pushy or too demanding, a
virtual environment with more depersonalization and less social impact than faceto-face interactions (Stuhlmacher & Citera, 2005; Stuhlmacher et al., 2007). It’s
important to note, however, that virtual negotiations, compared to face-to-face
negotiations, have been found to result in lower profit (Stuhlmacher & Citera,
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2005), therefore this option still does not provide a solution to accelerate the
gender pay gap convergence.
When providing this recommendation, it is important to remember the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 (United States, 1963), in the hopes that these findings will
not be used to knowingly place individuals, specifically women, at a
disadvantage. Given that negotiation medium is only one factor that can
contribute to inequalities in salary negotiations, it is advisable to consider salary
negotiation practices as a whole, limiting ambiguity and discrimination
throughout the practice. Therefore, this also calls for further research into
practices and interventions which create equal opportunities for all employees.
Overall, the findings of this study demonstrate that both men and women
with higher anxiety about the upcoming negotiation have a higher preference for
virtual negotiations. This finding can lead to future research on what specific
properties of virtual negotiations seem to be more in line with anxious
negotiators. This could guide interventions and training seminars to equalize
perceived differences between the two mediums.
Conclusion
This study created a situation which minimized gender effects in
negotiation by manipulating the framing of the negotiation as distributive or
integrative. While this manipulation was unsuccessful in reducing the behavioral
effects found by Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017), it contributes to the negotiation
literature by demonstrating the strength of this gender difference even with the
inclusion of an integrative framing, which is theoretically more congruent with
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the female gender role (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Future research could
consider the complete removal of the word “negotiate” from the study or the time
point at which participants are asked to choose a negotiation medium.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Demographic Variable

n

Percentage

Mean

SD

Male

104

50.49%

Female

102

49.51%

White

117

56.80%

Black/African American

16

7.76%

Asian/Pacific Islander

21

10.19%

Latino/Hispanic/Spanish
Origin

26

12.62%

5

2.43%

10

4.85%

Face-to-Face

2.99

1.56

Virtual

2.20

1.48

77.06

99.34

Emails Per Day

4.29

8.52

Phone Calls Per Day

3.78

5.72

Video Calls Per Day

1.09

1.82

Gender

Race/Ethnicity

Biracial
Other
Negotiation Experience a

Technology Familiarity b
Text Messages Per Day

a

b

Note. Negotiation Experience was measured with a 7-point scale. Technology
Familiarity was measured with open ended questions (responses ranged 0 to
1000).
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of the Main Variables by Gender and Condition
Males
Distributive
Variables
Preferences a
Fear of
Backlash b
Anxiety a
Self-efficacyc
a

Mean

SD

Females
Integrative

Mean

SD

Distributive
Mean

SD

Integrative
Mean

SD

3.15

1.82

3.23

1.73

4.52

2.02

4.07

1.81

398.78

127.16

396.46

130.77

426.44

131.77

442.25

124.49

3.21

1.15

3.40

1.10

4.11

1.31

4.32

1.10

71.06

15.54

70.33

13.24

62.46

18.86

63.33

17.12

b

Note. Preferences and Anxiety were measured on a 7-point scale. Backlash was
an open ended question (points ranged from 150 to 750). c Self-efficacy was
measured on a 100-point scale.
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Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of the Main Variables
Variables

Mean

SD

1

1. Gender a

---

---

---

b

---

---

0.24**

---

3.63

2.04

0.28**

0.76**

---

4. Fear of Backlash 415.72

129.13

0.14*

0.16*

0.22**

---

1.25

0.36**

0.28**

0.28**

-0.18**

---

16.65

-0.23**

-0.28**

-0.26**

0.26**

-0.41**

2. Method

3. Preferences
5. Anxiety
6. Self-efficacy

3.76
66.82
a

2

3

4

b

5

Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01. Gender (Male = 0, Female = 1). Method (Face-toface = 0, Virtual = 1).
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Table 4
Coefficients for Logistic Regression Main Effects Model 0 for Choice of
Negotiation Medium
b

SE

z

Intercept

-0.50

0.28

-1.81

0.070

Gender

0.58

0.33

1.79

0.074

Condition

-0.56

0.31

-1.79

0.073

Fear of Backlash

-0.16

0.16

-1.00

0.317

Anxiety

0.36

0.18

2.01

0.045*

Self-efficacy

-0.41

0.19

-2.21

0.024*

Note. * p < .05. N = 206.

p
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Table 5
Coefficients for Logistic Regression Interaction Model 1 for Choice of
Negotiation Medium
b

SE

z

Intercept

-0.49

0.33

-1.46

0.145

Gender

0.67

0.45

1.49

0.137

Condition

-0.52

0.47

-1.09

0.275

Backlash

0.03

0.23

0.13

0.894

Anxiety

0.85

0.32

2.67

0.008**

Self-efficacy

-0.13

0.32

-0.43

0.670

Gender*Fear of Backlash

-0.42

0.33

-1.27

0.203

Gender*Anxiety

-0.78

0.39

-1.97

0.048*

Gender*Self-efficacy

-0.36

0.40

-0.91

0.363

Gender*Condition

-0.14

0.64

-0.22

0.829

Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01. N = 206.

p
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Table 6
Chi Squared Test Comparing Model 1 to Model 0
Res. Df

Res. Dev

Model 0

200

244.48

Model 1

196

238.47

Note. * p < .05.

Df

Deviance

p

4

6.011

0.198
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Table 7
Probability Estimates for Choice of Negotiation Medium for Logistic Regression
Main Effects Model 0

Gender

Condition

Logit

Odds
Ratio

Probability of
Choosing Textbased Chat
Program

Probability
of Choosing
Face-to-Face

Male

Distributive

-0.50

0.61

0.3773

0.6227

Male

Integrative

-1.06

0.35

0.2573

0.7427

Female

Distributive

0.08

1.08

0.5202

0.4798

Female

Integrative

-0.48

0.62

0.3826

0.6174

Note. N = 206.
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Table 8
Probability Estimates for Choice of Negotiation Medium for Logistic Regression
Main Effects Model 1

Gender

Condition

Logit

Odds
Ratio

Probability of
Choosing Textbased Chat
Program

Probability
of Choosing
Face-to-Face

Male

Distributive

-0.63

0.54

0.3488

0.6512

Male

Integrative

-1.14

0.32

0.2423

0.7577

Female

Distributive

0.04

1.05

0.5112

0.4888

Female

Integrative

-0.47

0.62

0.3843

0.6157

Note. N = 206.
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Table 9
Probability Estimates for Choice of Negotiation Medium for Logistic Regression
Main Effects Model 1based on Anxiety as a Moderator

Gender

Condition Anxiety

Logit

Odds
Ratio

Probability of
Choosing Textbased Chat
Program

Probability
of Choosing
Face-to-Face

Male

Distributive Low

-1.04

0.35

0.2608

0.7392

Male

Distributive High

-0.21

0.81

0.4486

0.5514

Male

Integrative

Low

-1.56

0.21

0.1739

0.8261

Male

Integrative

High

-0.72

0.49

0.3268

0.6732

Female

Distributive Low

-0.37

0.69

0.4078

0.5922

Female

Distributive High

0.46

1.59

0.6136

0.3864

Female

Integrative

Low

-0.89

0.41

0.2912

0.7088

Female

Integrative

High

-0.05

0.95

0.4866

0.5134

Note. N = 206.
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Table 10
Coefficients for Main Effects Model 0, examining the effects of gender, fear of
backlash, anxiety, and negotiator self-efficacy on preference for virtual
negotiations
b

SE

t

Intercept

-0.13

0.12

-1.10

0.271

Gender

0.38

0.14

2.73

0.007**

Condition

-0.12

0.13

-0.93

0.352

0.12

0.07

1.75

0.083

0.13

0.08

1.82

0.070

-0.12

0.07

-1.67

0.096

Fear of Backlash
Anxiety
Self-efficacy
Note. * p < .05.

p
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Table 11
Coefficients for Interaction Model 1, examining the interaction of gender on fear
of backlash, anxiety, negotiator self-efficacy, and condition for preference of
virtual negotiations
b

SE

t

Intercept

-0.17

0.14

-1.25

Gender

0.52

0.20

2.76

0.006**

Condition

0.00

0.18

0.00

0.999

Backlash

-0.03

0.09

-0.34

0.732

Anxiety

0.23

0.12

1.98

0.049*

Self-efficacy

-0.16

0.12

-1.34

0.183

0.33

0.13

2.46

0.015*

Gender*Anxiety

-0.19

0.15

-1.27

0.204

Gender*Self-efficacy

0.09

0.15

0.64

0.525

Gender*Condition

-0.27

0.26

-1.06

0.293

Gender*Fear of Backlash

Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01.

p
0.215
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Table 12
ANOVA Comparing Model 1 to Model 0
Res. Df

RSS

Model 0

200

173.85

Model 1

196

166.20

Note. * p < .05.

Df

Sum of
Squares

F

p

4

7.647

2.254

0.065
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Participant
randomly assigned
to condition upon
arrival
(Appendix A)

Informed Consent
(Appendix B)

Negotiation Task
with Framing
Instructions
(Appendix C)

Measures: Goals
(Appendix D),
Negotiator Selfefficacy (Appendix
E), Negotiator
Anxiety (Appendix F)

Participants asked to
choose Face-to-face
or Text-based Chat
Program, rated
preferences
(Appendix G)

Given second set of
tasks (Appendix C)

Measures: Goals
(Appendix D) and
Preference for
Mediums (Appendix
G)

Experimenter steps
out of room to
“inform hiring
manager of
medium”

Measures: Controls
and Demographic
Survey (Appendix
H)

Experimenter
informs participant
that no negotiation
of interaction will
occur

Measure:
Relief/Regret
(Appendix I)

Debriefing
(Appendix J)

Figure 1. Flow diagram of the experimental procedure.
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Fear of
Backlash

+

+

Preference for
Virtual
Negotiation

Anxiety

Self-efficacy

Gender

Figure 2. Model for Hypotheses III-VIII. This figure illustrates the relationships
of the variables Fear of Backlash, Anxiety, and Self-efficacy on preference for
virtual negotiations, with Gender as a moderator.
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Figure 3. Interaction for Hypothesis VI illustrating the relationship between fear
of backlash and preference for virtual negotiations by gender.
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Figure 4. Interaction for Hypothesis VII illustrating the relationship between
anxiety and preference for virtual negotiations by gender.
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Figure 5. Interaction for Hypothesis VIII illustrating the relationship between
self-efficacy and preference for virtual negotiations by gender.
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Distributive

Integrative

Figure 6. Interaction for Negotiation Framing Condition (Distributive vs.
Integrative) illustrating the relationship between self-efficacy and preference for
virtual negotiations by gender.
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Appendix A
Random Numbers Tables
Males
Participant
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Condition
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative

Participant
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Condition
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive

Participant
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Condition
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive

58

Females
Participant

Condition

Participant

Condition

Participant

Condition

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive

161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative

201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
Integrative
Distributive
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Appendix B
Consent form
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
LANDING A NEW JOB
Principal Investigator: Kaitlyn Gallagher
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA
Department (School, College): Department of Psychology, College of Science &
Health
What is the purpose of this research?
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more
about job offer negotiation. This study is being conducted by Kaitlyn Gallagher, a
graduate Industrial/Organizational psychology student for her Master’s thesis. We
hope to include 200 participants in this research.
Why are you being asked to be in the research?
You are invited to participate in this study because you are a student in the
participant pool at DePaul University and speak English. You must be age 18 or
older to be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of people
under the age of 18.
What is involved in being in the research study?
If you agree to be in this study, being in the research involves completing a few
questionnaires, then participating in a negotiation with a counterpart.
• You will be told about participating in a simulated job offer negotiation.
You will receive some instruction about your negotiation counterpart and
how the negotiation will be scored.
• You will be asked about your preferences for the negotiation, your
feelings about the negotiation, and some demographic information about
yourself (past negotiation experience, work experience, gender,
race/ethnicity)
How much time will this take?
This study will take about 45 minutes of your time.
Are there any risks involved in participating in this study?
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would
encounter in daily life. You may feel uncomfortable or embarrassed about
answering certain questions or the idea of negotiation. You do not have to answer
any questions you do not want to.
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Are there any benefits to participating in this study?
You will not personally benefit from being in this study. We hope that what we
learn will help contribute to the knowledge in the field for negotiation.
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study?
You will be given 1.5 psychology subject pool credits for participation in the
research. At the end of the research activity you will be asked to provide your
SONA subject pool number on a separate sheet of paper so that we may give you
credit. If you do not complete the study but stay for more than a half hour you will
receive 1 credit. If you do not complete the study and stay for less than a half hour
you will receive 0.5 credits. You must provide your subject pool number in order
to be given credit.
Can you decide not to participate?
Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate.
There will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you
decide not to participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the
research after you begin participating. Your decision whether or not to participate
in this research will not affect your grades at DePaul University.
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the
information collected for the research be protected?
The research records will be kept and stored securely. The data will be recorded
in a de-identified manner. We will keep your responses confidential. Your
information will be combined with information from other people taking part in
the study. When we write about the study or publish a paper to share the research
with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have
gathered. We will not include your name or any information that will directly
identify you. We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the
research team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that
information is. However, some people might review or copy our records that
may identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules, laws,
and regulations. For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board
may review your information. If they look at our records, they will keep your
information confidential.
Who should be contacted for more information about the research?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study,
please ask any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have
questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get
additional information or provide input about this research, you can contact the
researcher, Kaitlyn Gallagher (kgalla26@depaul.edu) or her advisor, Dr. Alice
Stuhlmacher (773-325-2050).
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This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review
Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you
may contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research
Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at
sloesspe@depaul.edu.
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if:
• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the
research team.
• You cannot reach the research team.
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team.
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.
Statement of Consent from the Subject:
I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns
answered. By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.
Signature:_______________________________________________
Printed name: ________________________________________Date:
_________________
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Appendix C
Tasks
Distributive:
You have been hired for a new job, but you still need to work out the finer details
of terms of employment with your hiring manager. Think of this task as a
negotiation in which you are trying to get what you want and must bargain
for it.
Integrative:
You have been hired for a new job, but you still need to work out the finer details
of terms of employment with your hiring manager. Think of this task as a
negotiation in which you face a common problem and must work with the
hiring manager to create a deal that works for both you and the company.
This table shows the options that you will discuss:
Option
Points
Salary

Option
Points
Vacation Days

Option
Points
Starting Date

$50,000

0

5 days

0 June 1

200

$52,000

100

8 days

25 June 15

100

$54,000

200

12 days

50 July 1

50

$56,000

300

15 days

100 July 15

25

$58,000

400

20 days

150 August 1

0

The points indicate how valuable that selection is to you. In this
negotiation, you can earn a maximum of 750 points. You should walk
away from the negotiation (impasse) if you cannot achieve at least
150 points.
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Take a few minutes and list three tactics you will use to meet this
goal (of getting what you want / creating a deal that works for both
you and the company)
1. ____________________
2. ____________________
3. ____________________
This table shows the options that you will discuss:
Option
Points
First-year Bonus

Option
Company Car

$1,000

0

Honda

$2,000

100

$4,000

Points Option
Points
Training Opportunities
0

Every 6 months

200

Hyundai

25

Every 12 month

100

200

Mazda

50 Every 18 months

50

$6,000

300

BMW

100 Every 24 months

25

$8,000

400

Mercedes

150

Every 32 months

0

The points indicate how valuable that selection is to you. In this
negotiation, you can earn a maximum of 750 points. You should walk
away from the negotiation (impasse) if you cannot achieve at least
150 points.
Take a few minutes and list three tactics you will use to meet this
goal (of getting what you want / creating a deal that works for both
you and the company)
1. ____________________
2. ____________________
3. ____________________
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Appendix D
Goals and First Offer
The following questions concern your plans for the upcoming
negotiation. Please indicate...
The ideal number of points you want to achieve in the
negotiation (that is your goal)
The least number of points you are willing to accept before
walking away from the negotiation at an impasse (that is your
limit)

Now, make your first offer to your counterpart.
For each category please circle one value.
Circle one value for each category:
Option
Points Option
Salary
Vacation Days
$50,000

0 5 days

$52,000

Points

Option
Starting Date

Points

0 June 1

200

100 8 days

25 June 15

100

$54,000

200 12 days

50 July 1

50

$56,000

300 15 days

100 July 15

25

$58,000

400 20 days

150 August 1

The following questions concern your plans for the upcoming
negotiation. Please indicate...
How much (in total points value) do you think you can
reasonably ask for without your counterpart perceiving
you to be a pushy person?
How much (in total points value) do you think you can
reasonably ask for without causing your counterpart to
punish you for being too demanding?

0
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Now, make your first offer to your counterpart.
For each category please circle one value.
Circle one value for each category:
Option
Points
First-year Bonus

Option
Company Car

$1,000

0

Honda

$2,000

100

$4,000

Points Option
Points
Training Opportunities
0

Every 6 months

200

Hyundai

25

Every 12 month

100

200

Mazda

50 Every 18 months

50

$6,000

300

BMW

100 Every 24 months

25

$8,000

400

Mercedes

150

Every 32 months

0
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Appendix E
Negotiator Self-efficacy (Sullivan, O'Connor, & Burris, 2006)

Please indicate on a 100-point scale (0 = no confidence, 100 = full confidence)
your confidence that you can use the following tactics successfully in the
following negotiation:
1. Persuade the other negotiator to make most of the
concessions.

__________

2. Convince the other negotiator to agree with me.

__________

3. Gain the upper hand against the other negotiator

__________

4. Prevent the other negotiator from exploiting your
weaknesses.

__________

5. Find trade-offs that benefit both parties

__________

6. Exchange concessions

__________

7. Look for an agreement that maximizes both
negotiators’ interests’

__________

8. Establish a high level of rapport with the other
negotiator

__________
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Appendix F
Negotiator Anxiety (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011)

For the upcoming negotiation, how strongly do you feel:
Not
strongly
at all

Very
Strongly

Moderately

Anxious

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Neutral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Apprehensive

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Indifferent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Worried

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unemotional

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Nervous

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Calm

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix G
Negotiation Medium Preference

1. How would you like to negotiate today?
Face-to-face

Text-based Chat Program

2. Please circle a number for how strongly you would prefer to negotiate
either face-to-face or over a virtual text-based chat program:
(Face-to-Face)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

(Virtual)

While we set up, what are the reasons you picked the method of negotiation that you
did (face-to-face or chat)?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
____________
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Appendix H
Demographic Survey
1. How much formal experience have you had negotiating face-to face (this
includes negotiation/mediation courses or formal experience)?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
(No experienced)

(Some experience)

(I’m an expert)
2. How much formal experience have you had negotiating virtually through
technology (this includes negotiation/mediation courses or formal
experience)?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
(No experienced)

(Some experience)

(I’m an expert)
3. On an average day, how many text-messages do you send?
_____________
4. On an average day, how many emails do you send? _____________
5. On an average day, how many phone calls are you on? _____________
6. On an average day, how many video calls are you on (Skype, Facetime)?
_____________
7. Please indicate your gender:
Male

Female
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8. Please indicate your race/ethnicity:
Black/African American
American Indian/Alaskan Native
Asian /Pacific Islander
Latino/Hispanic/Spanish Origin
White
Biracial
Other
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Appendix I
Negotiator Relief/Regret (Kray & Gelfand, 2009)

1. How relieved are you that there is no real negotiation?
1

2

3

(Not relieved)

4

5

6

(Moderately)

7

(Very relieved)

2. How much do you regret not being able to negotiate?
1

2

(Not regretful)

3

4
(Moderately)

5

6

7
(Very regretful)
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Appendix J
Debriefing Forms

Thank you so much for participating in this research session, we very much
appreciate your willingness to be involved in this research.
This study looked at negotiation, which is a very common interaction in many
everyday situations. While you may have not been familiar with job negotiation,
we wanted a task that was relevant to students.
We asked people to choose whether they prefer to negotiate via face-to-face or
through a computer chat program. There is no actual negotiation involved in this
study. We wanted you to have the same feelings that you might have if there
would be an actual negotiation.
We are interested how factors like gender, self-efficacy, and anxiety influenced
the choice to be face-to face or over the computer.
You no doubt understand that it is important to have a similar environment for
everyone who participates in the study. Because of this, we need your help in not
revealing information about this study to others who may be involved or might do
this study in the future. This is very important so that we are able to compare
across people and that participants enter the study with the same information.
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Thank you so much for participating in this research session, we very much
appreciate your willingness to be involved in this research.
This study looked at negotiation, which is a very common interaction in many
everyday situations. While you may have not been familiar with negotiations, we
wanted a task that was relevant to students.
This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review
Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may
contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research Compliance,
in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at
sloesspe@depaul.edu.
Below are a couple of references for more information on negotiation, and you
can also contact Kaitlyn Gallagher (kgalla26@depaul.edu) or Dr. Alice
Stuhlmacher (astuhlma@depaul.edu ,773-325-2050) for more information. Again,
thank you so much for your time and participation.
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